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INTRODUCTION
The question of the role of profits in personal injury litigation
has caused considerable consternation in the courts. The following
quotation from Lo Sch'avo v. Northern Ohio Traction & Light Co...
presents a statement of the status of the problem which would be equally
apropos in most jurisdictions:
The able and diligent efforts of counsel have pointed out
the confusion which exists among the authorities upon these
questions and the necessity for a rule .. . to govern the trial
of cases similar to the instant case. It is indeed startling to
discover that after the lapse of one hundred and twenty years
from the time of the organization of this state not a single
case has been reported by this court which will throw any light
upon the legal question involved. It may be strongly suspected
either that many similar cases have 'been decided without report
or that motions to certify have been overruled. It is even more
startling to observe that in many jurisdictions which have dealt
with the question, the rules attempted to 'be announced have
only resulted in causing even greater confusion. Text writers
have never seriously attempted to evolve a uniform rule from
the authorities, but have contented themselves with digesting
the contradictory cases, and have many times used language
showing a failure to grasp the principles involved.2
If the court had provided an answer equal to the need they expressed,
this article could serve no better purpose than to present that opinion;
however, the result of the decision 'has been "even greater confusion." 3
When used in the article and ,by most of the courts, "profits"
means the gain of an enterprise-income minus expenses.4 "Earnings"
*Instructor, Ohio State University College of Law; member of the Ohio Bar.
1106 Ohio St. 61, 138 N.E. 372, 27 A.L.R. 424 (1922).
21d. at 67, 68, 138 N.E. at 374.
3 Hanna v. Stoll, 112 Ohio St. 344, 147 N.E. 339 (1925) ; Gibbons v. Baltimore
& Ohio Railroad, 92 Ohio App. 87, 109 N.E.2d 366 (1952); Dowd-Feder Co. v.
Truesdell, 17 Ohio L. Abs. 647 (1934) aff'd, 130 Ohio St. 530, 200 N.E. 647 (1936) ;
Lund v. Kline, 24 Ohio L. Abs. 387 (1937), rev'd on other grounds, 133 Ohio St.
317, 13 N.E.2d 575 (1938).
4 "The excess of returns over expenditures in a given transaction or series of
transactions." WEBSTER, NEw INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1938); "Profits
represent the net gain made from the prosecution of some business after the pay-
ment of all expenses incurred." Goodhart v. Pennsylvania Ry., 177 Pa. 1, 35 AtI.
191 (1896). "Profit is ordinarily understood to refer to acquisition beyond expendi-
ture or excess of value received over cost." Sutter Hospital of Sacramento v.
Sacramento, 236 P.2d 186 (Cal. App. 1951), aft'd, 39 Cal. 233, 244 P.2d 390 (1952).
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means personal earnings--the fruit of one's labor.5 For the economist
these would be totally inadequate definitions. They are acceptable for
these purposes since they convey the impression that profits are not
necessarily a measure of the pecuniary value of one's labor.
The problem of profits is not uniquely a problem of personal injury
litigation. It may be raised in other actions-namely-tort actions where
an instrumentality employed by the plaintiff foir purposes of making a
profit has been converted or destroyed by the defendant; 6 tort actions,
or their statutory equivalents, where plaintiff's business has been destroyed
or injured by some anti-competitive action of the defendant;' and in
actions for breach of contract.' This article is addressed singularly to
profits in personal injury litigation.
As a question of damages, loss of profits has existed as an issue
as long as the action for personal injury itself. The present importance
is due in part to the increased number of personal injury actions brought
about by the advent of the automobile accident era.
The general theory of damages in personal injury litigation is one
of compensation. The court attempts to put the plaintiff in the financial
position he would have been were it not for the acts of the defendant.
To accomplish this purpose, some of the major elements of damage
to which the plaintiff is entitled are the reasonable value of medical
expenditures, 9 pain and suffering,"° fright,"' humiliation,12 inconveni-
5 ". . [F]ruit or reward of labor-the price of services performed". Good-
hart v. Pennsylvania Ry., supra note 4; Dempsey v. Scranton, 264 Pa. 495,
107 At. 877 (1919).
6 Straley v. Fisher, 176 Va. 163, 10 S.E.2d 551 (1940) ; Byers v. Shelton, 282
S.W. 635 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926), 19 FORDHAM L. REv. 223 (1950).
7 Roseland v. Phister Mfg. Co., 125 F.2d 417 (2d Cir. 1942); Wawak & Co.
v. Kaiser, 129 F.2d 66 (7th Cir. 1942) ; Package Closure Corporation v. Sealright
Co., 141 F.2d 972, (2d Cir. 1944); American Can Co. v. LaGoda Canning Co.,
44 F.2d 763 (7th Cir. 1930) cert. denied 282 U.S. 899; John B. Stetson Co. v.
Stephen L. Stetson Co., 58 F. Supp. 586 (S.D.N.Y. 1944) cert. denied 299 U.S. 605,
64 HARV. L. REv. 317 (1950).
8 Collins v. LaVelle, 19 R.I. 45, 31 At. 434 (1895) ; Julian Petroleum Corpo-
ration v. Courtney Petroleum Co., 22 F.2d 360 (9th Cir. 1927) ; Comment, Lost
Profits as Contract Damages, 65 YALE L.J. 993 (1956).
9 Roland v. Murray, 239 S.W.2d 967 (Ky. 1951); Guerra v. Balestrieri 127
Cal. App. 2d 511, 274 P.2d 443 (1954); Texas & N.O.R. Co. v. Barham, 204
S.W.2d 205 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947); MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF
DAMAGES §90 (1935).
10 Harris v. Breezy Point Lodge, Inc., 238 Minn. 335, 56 N.W.2d 655 (1953);
Parrott v. Hanson, 180 Ore. 620, 175 P.2d 169 (1946) ; Campbell v. Hall, 210 S.C.
423, 435 S.E.2d 129 (1947); MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES §88
(1935).
11 Cote v. Litawa, 96 N.H. 174, 71 A.2d 792 (1950); Houston Electric Co. v.
Dorsett, 145 Tex. 95, 194 S.W.2d 546 (1946). McCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE
LAW OF DAMAGES §88 (1935).
12 Eick v. Perk Dog Food Co., 347 Ill. App. 293, 106 N.E.2d 742 (1952);
Toller v. Cassinelli, 129 W.Va. 591, 41 S.E.2d 672 (1947) ; Mitchell v. Pla-Mar,
[Vol. 19
ROLE OF PROFITS
ence, 13 and impairment of earning capacity.' 4 The courts divide impair-
ment of earning capacity into loss of profits which refers to the past,
and future impairment of earning capacity which refers to the future.
This article rejects this distinction. The importance of any one of these
elements will depend upon the particular facts of the injury. One of
the few generalizations that can be drawn is that the amount of damage
varies in direct proportion to the seriousness of the injury. This becomes
tautological when it is observed that the seriousness of the injury must
be defined with reference to the amount of damages suffered by the
plaintiff. However, compensation for impairment of earning capacity
differs from other elements of damages in that the amount of the
award is not entirely dependent upon the seriousness of the injury. That
is to say, if the owner and manager of an exclusive retail business and
a janitor of that business were caused to suffer the same injury, all the
elements of damages except impairment of earning capacity would be
equal. This is not true of impairment of earning capacity because by
hypothesis the earning capacity of one is greater than the other. Impair-
ment of earning capacity then becomes a logical basis for the difference
in the amounts of the verdicts for the janitor and the owner of the
business.
PROFITS AS AN ELEMENT OF DAMAGE
Whether or not it was ever contended that future lost profits
were an element of damage in personal injury cases cannot be deter-
mined. It is suspected that at one time it must have been so argued since
most courts preface consideration of profits with a comment similar to
"profits are not an element' of damage."'" One of the reasons that it
is impossible to tell how seriously this was ever contended is that the
evidence is also argued to be proof of impairment of earning capacity
and the court usually bases its decision on this argument after it has
commented that profits are not an element of damage. However, since
the statement is so frequently repeated in the cases, perhaps an examina-
tion of the reasons for the principle should be examined.
Inc., 361 Mo. 946, 237 S.W.2d 189 (1951). MCCORMfIcK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW
OF DAMAGES §88 (1935).
13Meiroto v. Thompson, 356 Mo. 32, 201 S.W.2d 161 (1947). MCCORMICK,
HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES §88 (1935).
14 St. Louis, I.M.&S. Ry. v. Eichelman, 118 Ark. 36, 175 S.W. 388 (1915);
Texas Electric Ry. v. Worthy, 250 S.V. 710 (Texas App. 1923); Silsby v.
Michigan Car Co., 95 Mich. 204, 54 N.E. 761 (1893) ; Steitz v. Gifford, 280 N.Y.
15, 19 N.E.2d 661 (1939) ; Goodhart v. Pennsylvania Ry. Co., supra note 4.
McCoRMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES §§86, 87 (1935).
15 Silsby v. Michigan Car Co., supra note 14; Muench v. Heinemann, 119
Wis. 441, 96 N.W. 800 (1903); Goodhart v. Pennsylvania R., supra note 4;
Osterode v. Almquist, 89 Cal. App. 2d 15, 200 P.2d 169 (1948) ; Ray v. United
Electric Rys. Co., 53 R.I. 173, 159 At. 637 (1932) ; Mitchell v. Chicago R.I. & P.
Ry., 138 Iowa 283, 114 N.W. 622 (1908); Lo Schiavo v. Northern Ohio Traction
& Light Co., 106 Ohio St. 61, 138 N.E. 372 (1922).
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By an element of damage it is meant that if profits were to be
treated as such, they would be equivalent to reasonable medical expendi-
tures, pain and suffering, etc. Thus, if the plaintiff could establish
the loss and could proximately relate it as a result of the defendant's
action, he would be entitled to compensation in the exact amount that
he proved the loss. Under this theory, the plaintiff would not have to
show that the profits were the result of his physical or intellectual labors,
but would only be required to prove that he would have had the sum
incoming, and that )because of the defendant's act he did not receive it.
Of course, the plaintiff would have to prove to the satisfaction of the
particular court what the profits would have been.
The courts decided that profits were not an element of damages
because they reflect the return on the labor of others, the return on
invested capital and the results of an active or inactive market."0 Since
such constitutent elements of profits are most probably not subject to
the exercise of the plaintiff's influence, they will continue to exist or
cease to exist independent of any act by the plaintiff or the defendant.'
Thus, if the plaintiff could not have controlled these items while he
was able, his disability caused by the defendant's act could not have
caused the loss. The theory of damages prevalent in personal injury
litigation does not require compensation for losses caused -by other factors
than the defendant's neglect.
The basic assumption by these courts remains as true today as it
was the day it was formulated. The principle that profits are not an
element of damage in personal injury litigation is valid not because it is a
principle but because of the reason underlying it-namely-profits have
constituent elements which could not be controlled by either the plain-
tiff's or the defendant's action and therefore the loss is not the result
of the defendant's act.
PROFITS AS PROOF OF IMPAIRMENT OF EARNING CAPACITY
The next group of cases which must be considered in a discussion
of the role of profits in personal injury litigation are those which raise
the issue of whether profits are every evidence of earning capacity.
Unlike the decisions on the question of profits as an element of damage,
these cases run the entire gamut. Some courts decide that profits are
evidence o£E earning capacity,' 8 others say they are not,' 9 while others
16,"Profits derived from the management of a business are generally not to
be considered as earning. The reason is obvious. Such profits usually result, not
solely from the physical or intellectual labor of the person owning and managing
the business but from combined capital and labor, labor not only of the person
injured, but of others as well." Dempsey v. Scranton, supra note 5; Lo Schiavo
v. Northern Ohio Traction & Light Co., supra note 15.
17 Burns v. Dunham, Corrigan & Hayden Co., 148 Cal. 208, 82 Pac. 959
(1905); Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry. v. Scheinkoenig, 62 Kan. 57, 61 Pac. 414 (1900).
18 Mahoney v. Boston Elevated Ry., 221 Mass. 116, 108 N.E. 1033 (1915);
Dempsey v. Scranton, supra note 5; Baxter v. Philadelphia & R. Ry., 264 Pa. 467,
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are indefinite as to their result.2" This array of views not only exists
between the jurisdictions but also exists within a single jurisdiction. 2
Decisions Holding Evidence of Profits Inadmissible
One of the most frequent objections stated by the courts is that
evidence of profits is too indefinite, too speculative and too conjectural.22
The division between lost profits and future impairment of earning
capacity mentioned earlier has probably resulted from this objection.
Some courts seem to believe that a plaintiff is better able to show what
he could have made from the date of the injury to the time of the
trial than he can show what he could have made from the time of the
trial to some date in the future.23 If this belief is true, then it must be
so because a plaintiff can show the condition of the economic past while
he cannot show the economic future.
As has been stated, this article rejects th separation of lost profits
107 At. 881 (1919); Mitchell v. Chicago R.I. & P. Ry. Co., supra note 15; Hart
v. Village of New Haven, 130 Mich. 181, 89 N.W. 677 (1902); Kranold v. City
of New York, 186 N.Y. 40, 78 N.E. 572 (1906); Offensend v. Atlantic Refining
Co., 322 Pa. 399, 185 At. 745 (1936) ; Comstock v. Connecticut Ry. & Lighting Co.,
77 Conn. 65, 58 Atl: 465 (1904); Wallace v. Pennsylvania Ry., 195 Pa. 127, 45
At. 685 (1900); Harmon v. Old Colony Ry., 168 Mass. 377, 47 N.E. 100 (1897) ;
Sinclair v. Columbia Telephone Co., 195 S.W. 558 (Mo. App. 1917); Town of
Elba v. Bullard, 152 Ala. 237, 44 So. 412 (1907) ; Chicago R.I. & P. Ry. v. Posten,
59 Kan. 449, 53 Pac. 465 (1898); Collins v. Dodge, 37 Minn. 503, 35 N.W. 368
(1887); Daull v. New Orleans Ry. & Light Co., 147 La. 1012, 86 So. 477 (1920) ;
Atlanta v. Jolly, 146 S.E. 770 (Ga. App., 1929) ; Rosenthal v. Harker, 56 Utah 113,
189 Pac. 666 (1920) ; Washenko v. C. Schmidt & Sons, Inc., 2 N.J. 269, 66 A.2d 159
(1949) ; Ashcraft v. C.G. Hussey & Co; " 359 Pa. 129, 58 A.2d 170 (1948) ; 1101
Park Ave. Corporation v. Cornell, 133 Misc. 397, 232 N.Y.S. 663 (1929) ; Loesberg
v. Fraad, 119 Misc. 447, 197 N.Y.S. 229 (1922).
10 Ray v. United Electric Rys. Co., supra note 15; Lombardi v. California
Street Cable Ry., 124 Cal. 311, 57 Pac. 66 (1899); Lo Schiavo v. Northern Ohio
Traction & Light Co., supra note 15; Bierbach v. Goodyear Rubber Co., 54 Wis.
208, 11 N.W. 514 (1882) ; Freedham v. Smith, 193 Minn. 569, 259 N.W. 80 (1935).
20 Alpin v. Dean, 231 Ala. 320, 164 So. 737 (1935) ; City of Pueblo v. Griffin,
10 Colo. 366, 15 Pac. 616 (1887) ; Ball v. T. J. Pardy Construction Co., 108 Conn.
549, 143 At. 855 (1928) ; Spreen v. Erie R.R., 219 N.Y. 533, 114 N.E. 1049 (1916);
Homan v. Franklin County, 40 Iowa 185, 57 N.W. 703 (1894).
21Lo Schiavo v. Northern Ohio Traction & Light Co., supra note 15 com-
pared to Lund v. Kline, 24 Ohio L. Abs. 387 (1937); Kranold v. City of New
York, supra note 18 compared to Spreen v. Erie R. Co., supra note 20; Town of
Elba v. Bullard, 152 Ala. 237, 44 So. 412 (1907) compared to Alabama City,
G & A. Ry. v. Lee, 200 Ala. 550, 76 So. 908 (1917); Freedham v. Smith, supra
note 19 compared to Collins v. Dodge, suPra note 18.
2 2 Kleinbin -v. Foskin, 321 Mo. 887, 13 S.W.2d 648 (1928); Mahoney v.
Boston Elevated Ry., 221 Mass. 116, 108 N.E. 1033 (1915) ; Lo Schiavo v. Northern
Ohio Traction & Light Co., supra note 15; Weir v. Union Ry. of New York City,
188 N.Y. 416, 81 N.E. 168 (1907); Normanden v. Kansas City, 206 S.W. 913 (Mo.
App. 1918).
23 Sluder v. St. Louis Transit Co., 189 Mo. 107, 88 S.W. 648 (1905)
McCoRMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES §87 (1935).
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and future impairment of earning capacity. There is a single term that
fits both of these elements and that term is impairment of earning
capacity. It is most illogical to say that evidence of profits may be intro-
duced to show what damage the plaintiff has suffered at the time of
the trial but that the same evidence cannot be projected into the future
to show what damage he will suffer in the future, if any. In those
cases reviewed where evidence of profits was admitted to show lost
profits, not a single case stated that the plaintiff was required to show
that the economic conditions had remained the same from the date of
the injury to the time of the trial. Apparently, the courts are not con-
cerned with the probabilities that such an economic change has occurred.
Why then are they concerned about the probabilities of the change in
the future? The fact that the plaintiff is able to show his past suffering
with more definitness than he can show his future suffering has not
caused the courts to refuse all evidence of future suffering. The
evidence is admitted and its weight is determined by the jury. What
makes the jury more expert at determining future suffering than future
economic conditions is not disclosed by these cases. The distinction
between lost profits and future impairment of earning capacity cannot
be substantiated on the basis that the evidence of profits is more certain
in the former case than in the latter case.
As regards evidence of profits for purposes of proving impairment
of earning capacity, it must be admitted that there is an uncertainty
about projecting the evidence of past profits into the future. Despite
this admission, the question that remains is: Is that uncertainty so great
that the plaintiff will not be allowed to introduce the only evidence
that he may have of his earning capacity?
Although some courts continue to reject evidence of profits because
of its speculativeness,24 many courts have abandoned this position.25 It is
necessary for the plaintiff to prove his case, and if he does not offer
any more evidence in a case today than he could have at the turn of
24 See note 22 supra.
25 "Certainly a recovery of damages of this nature contains no greater ele-
ments of uncertainty than are inherent in many personal injury cases, as for
instance when recovery is permitted a parent for the decreased earning capacity
during his minority of a child of 3Y2 years." Jackiewicz v. United Illuminating
Co., 106 Conn. 310, 312, 138 At]. 151 (1927). "Mere difficulty in the assessment of
damages is not a sufficient reason for refusing them where the right to them has
been established." Bridgeport v. Aetna Indemnity Co., 91 Conn. 197, 205, 99 At.
566 (1916). "It is error to submit to a jury the loss of earning power as an
element of damage in the absence of proof upon the subject. But such proof need
not be clear and indubitable to entitle it to go to the jury." Simpson v. Penn-
sylvania R.R., 210 Pa. 101, 59 Atl. 693 (1904). "We cannot agree with the de-
fendant that the damages were speculative because the pecuniary loss sustained
could not be proved with mathematical precision. Of necessity these damages must
be an approximation and where, as here, they are proved with reasonable certainty,
the precise amount of damages must be left to the jury." Ashcraft v. C.G. Hussey
& Co., supra note 18.
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this century, then it is not surprising to find the courts deciding that
the evidence is too uncertain. There is much more reliable evidence
today about the economic future than there has been in the past.26
The plaintiff should present this evidence. Further, the recent trend of
federal legislation is toward a more stable economy, and this fact should
be made known to the court, especially if such legislation is directed
to the protection of the plaintiff's type of enterprise.2" Any court prone
to decide that profits are too uncertain should be presented with the
question of what makes profits more indefinite than a wage or salary.
Labor organizations have so substantially tied wages and salaries to
profits that they are bound to be influenced by the same economic prin-
ciples that will determine profits. Still, the uncertainty that plagues
profits has never troubled the courts in a wage and salary case.
A more liberal view has been adopted in Sherman Antitrust and
breach of contract cases. In Package Closure Corporation v. Sealright
Co.>28 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals stated:
Where the tort itself is of such a nature as to preclude
the ascertainment of the amount of damages with certainty, it
would be a perversion of fundamental principles of justice to
2 6 This statement should be expanded into an article itself. Today's business-
men are relying upon many sources of information for purposes of expanding their
operation to meet future needs. The courts should not remain oblivious to this
same material. For an excellent article seeking the use of this information in
contract cases see Comment, Lost Profits as Contract Damages, 65 YALE L. J. 993
(1956).
27 "From this deep faith have evolved three main purposes of our Federal
Government.... Second, to help keep our economy vigorous and expanding, thus
sustaining our international strength and assuring better jobs, better living, better
opportunities for every citizen. . . ." The State of the Union message delivered
on January 6, 1955, by President Eisenhower, 101 CONG. REc. 94 (1955). "It is
hereby declared to be the policy of the Congress and the purpose of this title to
protect and increase farm income. . . ." Agricultural Act of 1956, Public Law 540
§102, 70 STAT. 188, 7 U.S.C.A. §§1801-1837, 1851-1860, 1881-1888. Although the
Federal Government has not become a guarantor of a completely stablized
economy, there are many governmental activities which are toward the prevention
of extreme deviations. Today, as this article is being written, there are proposals
to reduce taxes, increase government building projects, etc., all designed to prevent
a threatened economic "recession." These developments should remove part of
the uncertainty which exists concerning the economic future. How successful this
government activity will be remains to be seen, nevertheless this activity tends
to increase the probabilities of a stabilized economy. As these probabilities in-
crease, uncertainty decreases.
28 141 F.2d 972 (2d Cir. 1944). "The fact that damages cannot be calculated
with absolute exactness will not render them so uncertain as to preclude an
assessment. If a reasonable basis of computation be afforded by the evidence, that
is sufficient although only an approximate result be obtained." Roseland v. Phister
Mfg. Co., supra note 7. "Once evidence of damage has been established, plaintiff
may recover even though the amount is not capable of definite mathematical as-
certainment. In such cases the triers of the facts must fix the damages by reason-
able estimate and approximation." Wawak & Co. v. Kaiser, supra note 7.
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deny all relief to the injured person, and thereby relieve the
wrongdoer from making any amend for his acts. In such
cases, while the damages may not be determined 'by mere
speculation or guess, it will be enough if the evidence shows
the extent of the damages as a matter of just and reasonable
inferences, although the result be only approximate. The
wrongdoer is not entitled to complain that they cannot be
measured with the exactness and precision that would be pos-
sible if the case which he alone is responsible for making, were
otherwise.
The profits that the plaintiff would have made cannot be deter-
mined with definitness because the defendant so substantially incapaci-
tated the plaintiff that the profits were in fact not made.
In Julian Petroleum Corporation v. Courtney Petroleum Co.,, the
court observed,
No doubt there are elements of uncertainty in this case,
such as the fact of production, the amount of production, its
duration, the value of oil, and perhaps in other respects, but
the testimony was the best obtainable, and we think under the
authorities its weight was for the jury.
In the antitrust and breach of contract cases, lost profits are an
element of damages rather than a mere, measure of an element of
damages. This difference, however, provides no basis for requiring more
evidence in the personal injury cases than in the other cases. Also, in
the antitrust and breach of contract cases the defendant is an intentional
wrongdoer and therefore a "bad fellow," while in the personal injury
action the defendant is a negligent tortfeasor who is apparently thought
of as more of a "good fellow." Whether this distinction justifies the
requirement of a different quantum of proof is a debatable question.
In fact, whether the negligent driver should be considered a "good
fellow" is equally open to question.
There are a few courts that have solved the problem of admis-
sibility of evidence of profits by dosing their eyes to reality. In Spreen
v. Erie R. Co. 30 an action for wrongful death, the widow was asked
how much she received from her -husband, who, prior to his decease,
owned and conducted an express business. She was permitted to testify,
"All he made in the business-$35 per week." This evidence was
objected to on the ground that it was evidence of profits. The court
decided that the rule against profits had not been violated since, "Not a
single word was said about profits, in questioning the widow or in her
response." In Alabama City, G. & A. Ry. Co. v. Lee,31 the court
duplicated the error of the Spreen case. In this case, the plaintiff owned
29 22 F.2d 360 (9th Cir. 1927).
"30 219 N.Y. 533, 114 N.E. 1049 (1916).
31200 Ala. 550, 76 So. 908 (1917).
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and operated a sawmill. During 'his testimony, he was asked, "Before
you were injured, how much did you earn per month?" The plaintiff
answered, "I have made in the sawmill 'business as high as $100 per
month." On appeal, the defendant maintained that this testimony re-
ferred to profits and therefore should have been ruled inadmissible.
However, the court assumed that the testimony referred to a wage or
salary, else the defendant through his cross examination would have
shown that the evidence was of profits.
The approach taken by these courts is entirely indefensible. If
profits are not admissible in evidence, and profits are defined as the
gain of an enterprise, then the evidence was inadmissible in both of
these cases. No useful end can be accomplished by condemning the use
of the word "profits". If the gain of an enterprise is not an element of
damages then this is just as true whether the gain is called a "zylch"
or a cprofit."
Decsions Holding Evkdence of Profits Admssible
Those courts that decide profits are admissible in evidence do so on
two theories: (1) that cases where profits are primarily comprised of
the reward for plaintiff's personal services they become an element of
damage and the evidence is therefore admissible,3 2 and (2) that in such
a case profits are evidence of earning capacity." Although this disagree-
ment as to theories of admissibility does exist, there is general agreement
as to the cases in which the evidence is admissible. These cases are those
where the profits predominately reflect the pecuniary value of the plain-
tiff's physical and intellectual labors.3" In these cases the labor of others
and the investment of capital must be inconsequential.
32 Sinclair v. Columbia Telephone Co., 195 S.W. 588 (Mo. App. 1917);
Steitz v. Gifford, 280 N.Y. 15, 19 N.E.2d 661 (1939). "Under the above proof,
the jury would have been justified in finding and doubtless did find that plaintiff
in addition to other damages suffered under the first count, suffered also a loss of
profits to the extent of about $600 per month for a period oi about six months."
Hollander v. Wilson Estate Co., 214 Cal. 582, 587, 7 P.2d 177, 179 (1932).
33 "On the other hand, there are cases in which the allowances of proof of
loss of profits of a business conducted with little or no capital is necessary on the
ground that under the particular facts, such profits are entirely or almost entirely
the direct result of the personal labor and endeavor of the owner, and sub-
sequently, constitute the best standard of earning power." Dempsey v. City of
Scranton, 264 Pa. 495, 499, 107 At. 877, 879 (1919). Mitchell v. Chicago R.I. &
P. Ry. Co., 138 Iowa 283, 114 N.W. 622 (1908) ; Hart v. Village of New Haven,
130 Mich. 181, 89 NAV. 365 (1902); Kranold v. City of New York, 186 N.Y. 40,
78 N.E. 572 (1906) ; Offensend v. Atlantic Refining Co. 322 Pa. 399, 185 At. 745
(1936); Comstock v. Connecticut Ry. & Lighting Co., 77 Conn. 65, 58 At. 465
(1904); Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Posten, 59 Kan. 449, 53 Pac. 465 (1898) ;
Stafford v. City of Oskaloosa, 64 Iowa 251, 20 N.W. 174 (1884) ; Atlanta v. Jolly,
146 S.E. 770 (Ga. App. 1929).
34 "Where the element of personal expertness is the essential and dominant
factor and the capital invested is insignificant as compared with the earnings and
merely incidental to the individual capacity which is the fundamental cause of
19581
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Perhaps the best illustration of a court which has encountered this
difficulty because it seemingly did not recognize that there would be
cases in which profits would approximate earning capacity is the Ohio
Supreme Court. In Lo Schiavo v. Northern Ohio Traction and Light
Co. 35 the plaintiff owned and operated a trucking and fruit business.
He employed three persons and had capital assets which included two
trucks and one team of horses and a wagon. The plaintiff was permitted
to testify as to the profits of his business. The Supreme Court in its
opinion, reversing the lower court, observed:
Since all authorities agree that loss of profits of a business
is not a proper measure of damages in personal injury cases,
the only sure way of correctly applying such a rule is to keep
all evidence of profits from being in evidence.
3 6
This case was followed by Hanna v. StoliF where the plaintiff was
a general practitioner in medicine and surgery. In an action for personal
injuries the plaintiff alleged that he suffered a loss of earning capacity
and his pleading contained an averment "that at the time of his injury
he was earning $8000 a year." The court observed that the plaintiff
CCwas lefthanded, and the evidence tended to show that a piece of glass
embedded in the palm of his left hand had severed the tendon of the
index finger, which would materially interfere with the practice of his
profession, making it difficult if not impossible, to do certain things
required of a general practitioner of medicine and surgery." Upon
request, the trial court had instructed the jury that they might consider
"loss of earning power, if any, that the evidence by its greater weight
shows he will with reasonable certainty sustain in the future as a direct
result of his injuries affecting his. power to earn money." On appeal,
the defendant contended "that in order to recover for loss of earning
capacity it was absolutely essential to adduce evidence showing plaintiff's
earning capacity so that the difference between his earning capacity
before and after the accident could be determined. .. ."
The opinion quoted Thompson on Negligence as follows:
Generally loss of earning power can only be considered
as an element of damages where there is not evidence from
which the pecuniary extent of such loss may be estimated, and
where plaintiff asks damages because of his diminished earning
capacity, but gives no evidence of his capacity before or after
the income, then the income stands on the same basis as wages or salary and
may be shown." Mahoney v. Boston Elevated Ry., 221 Mass. 116, 117, 108 N.E.
1033, 1034 (1915); Weir v. Union Ry. Co. of New York City, 188 N.Y. 416,
81 N.E. 68 (1907).
35 106 Ohio St. 61, 138 N.E. 372, 27 A.L.R. 424 (1922).
3 6 1d. at 74, 138 N.E. at 376.
37 112 Ohio St. 344, 147 N.E. 339 (1925).
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the accident the question of such damages should not be sub-
mitted to the jury.3 8
The Court concluded its opinion with the following statement:
The authorities referred to indicate that such rule is
applied somewhat strictly in cases where a professional man is
seeking to recover damages for loss of earning capacity. In
this case, concededly, there was no evidence whatever which
could furnish a basis for determination of the loss incurred by
plaintiff by reason of the impairment of his earning capacity,
which for the reasons above indicated must have been a very
material factor in the determination of the verdict awarded
him. The rule above cited is peculiarly applicable to this case,
and we must conclude that it was prejudicial error to instruct
the jury that it could award damages for impaired earning
capacity in the absence of evidence upon which such finding
could be based."9
These two decisions, Lo Schiavo and Hanna, leave counsel for an
injured plaintiff in an almost impossible position. The Lo Schiavo case
forecloses the introduction of profits into evidence, and the Hanna case
requires such proof in the case of a professional person. How can the
decreased earning capacity of a "general practitioner in medicine and
surgery," who has been caused to suffer a "severed tendon of the index
finger," be shown unless it is possible to introduce evidence of his de-
creased income which admittedly is in the form of profits?
The facts in the Lo Schiavo case warranted the conclusion that
profits were not a measure of the plaintiff's earning capacity. This
is true because of the amount of labor of others and the capital invest-
ment involved. However, the court went further than to decide that
case. They attempted to solve all future cases by saying that profits
were not a measure of earning capacity in any personal injury action.
The Hanna case then presented the problem of what evidence is avail-
able to a person whose earnings are in the form of profits, when the
profits have as their primary constituent the pecuniary value of the
plaintiff's personal services. By its failure to see that profits were the
best evidence of earning capacity, the Hanna decision relegated the
plaintiff to a position where plaintiff would otherwise probably not be
found. There is no labor market for a doctor who by the exercise of
his preference desires to stay in private practice. Nor is there any better
way of determining his earning capacity other than comparing his past
earnings with what he is presently able to earn, because such a person
himself has never submitted his earning capacity to any other measure-
ment. How valid is it to say to a doctor who has been earning $8,000
38M. at 351, 147 N.E. at 342, quoting from 6 THOMPSON ON NEGLIGENCE,
§7307.
39 Id. at 354, 147 N.E. at 342.
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as a general practitioner that he must show his earning capacity through
evidence of the amount that he could have earned as an industrial doctor
or as a staff doctor in a hospital? If this reasoning has any basis, why
should he not be allowed to show how much he could have earned as
the private physician of the President of the United States? The obvious
answer is that he is neither an industrial doctor, a staff doctor, nor
the private physician of the President. He is a private practitioner, and
the best evidence of his earning capacity as such may well be the profits
that he earned while practicing.
The final answer to this problem has not been given by the Ohio
Supreme Court. The lower courts are apparently dissatisfied with the
strict language employed by the Lo Schiavo opinion. In Lund v. Kfize,"4
the plaintiff was engaged in soliciting order for his tailoring concern.
The tailoring was accomplished 'by employees of the plaintiff. The trial
court permitted the plaintiff to testify that as a result of the injury
his earning capacity was impaired by $2,000. The defendant argued
that this was evidence of profits and therefore inadmissible, citing the
Lo Schavo and the Hanna cases in support of his argument. The opinion
of the appellate court concluded as follows:
We believe that due to the character of the plaintiff's
business, and the method in which .he conducted it, that the
evidence submitted to the jury was competent, and that there
was no error in permitting it to go to the jury.41
The appellate court does not deny that the testimony referred to
profits, nor does the court indicate that the Lo Schiavo case permits
exceptions to its sweeping rule. The "character of the plaintiff's busi-
ness" must refer to the fact that the profits of the business were
primarily the result of plaintiff's personal services which make the earn-
ings more like the definition of "earning capacity" rather than "profits."
Thus, the bold statement of the Lo Schiavo case undergoes the processes
of legal erosion. Profits should be considered admissible in those cases
where they reflect the plaintiff's earning capacity as their primary
constituent.
It was noted at the beginning of this section that courts admit the
evidence on one of two theories. The issue of the preferability of one
theory over another is raised because of the great number of reversals
that occur in these cases. It is reasonable to assume that the confusing
language of the upper courts is the cause of the resulting confusion.
The fact remains that in a given case the choice between theories will
most probably not affect the result in that particular case.
Some courts say that in the cases where it can be shown that the
profits are the result of the plaintiff's personal endeavors there is an ex-
4024 Ohio L. Abs. 387 (1937), req'd on other grounds, 133 Ohio St. 317, 13
N.E.2d 575 (1938).
41 1d. at 395.
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ception to the rule that profits are not an element of damage.42 Why
the issue of whether profits are an element of damage is reexamined
when the question concerns the admissibility of the evidence is not clear.43
There is no case where the other factors, which have caused the
rule against profits to come into existence will entirely disappear. They
will be constituent elements of profits in every case. The only difference
between the cases will be the degree to which these factors prevail. To
say that in some there is an exception to the rule and that profits are an
element of damages in those cases, means that the plaintiff is entitled to
the amount of profits resulting from the labor of others and the return
on investment of such amount is not so large as to predominate. This is
indeed a curious result. These factors should not be an element of
plaintiff's damages no matter how small. The defendant should always
be able to get an instruction to the effect that the evidence of profits is
only evidence of earning capacity and to the extent that the jury deter-
mines it to be the result of other factors than the plaintiff's physical and
intellectual labors, that amount should not be a part of their award. If
the defendant is entitled to an instruction of this type, a fact with which
all courts agree, 4 then profits are not an element of damage, but are
evidence of an element of damage. Profits are no more of an element
of damage than salaries or wages are. They are evidence of earning
capacity just as salaries and wages are.
One answer to this criticism will be that this is a legal technicality
which could not be explained sufficiently for the jury to discern the
differentiation. Irrespective of this, the error of these courts is going to
complicate unnecessarily the decision in a case where, although the plain-
tiff's enterprise is one which would not fit within the exception, the
plaintiff is able to reduce the profits to their separate elements and intro-
duce only that part which represents his earning capacity.45 If a court
has adopted the theory that only certain cases fall within the exception,
then to permit this evidence they must create an exception to the ex-
ception or refuse the evidence.
48
4 2 Supra note 32.
43The only reason that a court would have to return to the rule would be
if the evidence was urged to be evidence of an element of damage-namely-loss
of profits as opposed to the theory that it is evidence of earning capacity.
44Alitz v. Minneapolis & St. L.R. Co., 196 Iowa 437, 193 N.W. 423 (1923);
Ashcraft v. C.G. Hussey & Co., 359 Pa. 129, 58 A.2d 170 (1948) ; Offensend v.
Atlantic Refining Co., 322 Pa. 399, 185 Ad. 745 (1936); Texas Electric Ry. v.
Worthy, 250 S.W. 710 (Texas App. 1923); Dempsey v. Scranton, 264 Pa. 495,
107 At. 877 (1919) ; Town of Elba v. Bullard, 152 Ala. 237, 44 So. 412 (1900) ;
Chicago R.I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Scheinkoenig, 62 Kans. 57, 61 Pac. 414; Rosenthal v.
Harker, 56 Utah 113, 189 Pac. 666 (1920).
45 Kranold v. City of New York, 186 N.Y. 40, 78 N.E. 572 (1906).
46This is true since presumably the only time a plaintiff would want to
segregate the elements of profits would be a case where the other factors con-
stituted a noticeable portion. These cases by definition are cases where profits
cannot be introduced and therefore do not fit the exception.
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Other cases have permitted the evidence on the theory that it is the
best available evidence of earning capacity.' This is a more desirable
analysis. Profits of a business are not the same as earning capacity so
long as they reflect other factors. They may or may not include plain-
tiff's earning capacity. When the other factors can be shown to be
de minimus and the remaining known factor is plaintiff's physical and
intellectual labors then profits -become evidence of earning capacity.
In evidentiary terms, testimony must 'be related to something which
the plaintiff is entitled to prove.4" If the evidence increases or decreases
the probabilities of a material proposition, then that evidence is relevant.49
When profits are reduced to the state that they predominately demon-
strate the plaintiff's earning capacity, and the plaintiff can show that since
the injury he has been unable to earn these profits, then the evidence in-
creases the probabilities of the truth of the material proposition that
plaintiff has suffered an impairment of earning capacity. It is relevant
and admissible. Not only does the evidence show that the plaintiff has
suffered an impairment of earning capacity, but it also shows the pecuni-
ary extent of the impairment."0 When a court answers the issue of
admissibility of evidence of profits on the basis that it is not admissible
because they are not an element of damage, the court has totally failed
to overtly recognize the problem. The rule that profits are not an ele-
ment of damage was never designed to settle the evidentiary issue.51
That rule is a restatement of the theory of damages in personal injury
cases-namely-the defendant shall be liable only for those damages
which are the proximate result of his act. When profits have been shown
to predominately reflect the pecuniary value of plaintiff's physical and
intellectual labors, and the plaintiff has -been disabled by the defendant's
act, then the impairment of earning capacity is the result of defendant's
act and the plaintiff is entitled to compensation. 52 The argument as to
the constituents of profits should be made to the court for purposes of
determining the relevancy of the evidence. The jury will then receive
only that evidence of profits which has been determined to show plaintiff's
earning capacity.
In Offensend v. Atlantic Refining Co.5" it was determined by the
court, in accordance with the rules of relevancy, that the evidence of
47 See note 33 supra.
48 1 WIGMORE, EvsoENc §27 (3d ed. 1940).
49 Ibid.
50 Sinclair v. Columbia Telephone Co., 195 S.W. 558 (Mo. App. 1917);
Rogers v. Youngs, 252 Mich. 420, 233 N.W. 365 (1930).
51 The rule against profits was designed to be a substantive rule of damages
not a rule of evidence. The only time that it will be necessary to consider the
rule as regards evidence is when the evidence is sought to be admitted on the
theory that profits are an element of damage. The rule causes such evidence to
be immaterial.
52 See note 33 supra.
53 322 Pa. 399, 185 At]. 745 (1936).
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profits was the best evidence of earning capacity. The plaintiff was per-
mitted to testify that his profits for the last year prior to the injury were
$1701. He claimed total loss of earning capacity for two years and
eight months. The jury awarded him $4536, an exact computation using
plaintiff's testimony multiplied by the period of total disability. About
this exact computation the Pennsylvania court stated:
Although net earning for a single year, especially when
proximate in time to the period when a loss of earning power
was suffered, may have some evidential bearing on the question,
it is evident that many other factors of importance might be in-
fluential and material during the period involved. The court
should have instructed the jury more carefully upon the weight
to be given to all the material elements having a 'bearing upon
the question of earning power. It is evident here that the jury
was guided largely 'by appellee's statement of his net income
for a single year. Under the circumstances, we are forced to
conclude that the damages assessed for loss of earning power
were in excess of those warranted by the evidence, and the true
measure for their calculation.
54
Although it is true that the jury should be instructed that this evidence is
solely for the purpose of determining the amount to be awarded for
impairment of earning capacity, as this jury was instructed, if they deter-
mine that they will decide the case on the basis of the evidence presented
at the trial, the verdict should not be disturbed. The reviewing court
should not be concerned with the obviousness of the jury's mathamatical
computation. If neither the plaintiff nor the defendant can further
segregate the elements of profits, the jury can hardly be expected to do so.
PROOF OF IMPAIRMENT OF EARNING CAPACITY
Since the courts are divided on the admissibility of evidence of profits
this section must be further divided into, Proof of Impairment of
Earning Capacity in Jurisdictions Where EsAdence of Profits is 11d-
missible and Proof of Impairnent of Earning Capacity in Jurisdictions
Where Evidence of Profits is Inadmissible. This division will also per-
mit a discussion of cases where, although the court would otherwise ad-
mit the evidence, the evidence is found to 'be irrelevant, because it does
not reflect the plaintiff's earning capacity. All that is said in the latter
subsection will be equally applicable to these cases. It should be re-
membered that, despite language to the contrary, a court rarely will im-
properly exclude the evidence if it is properly presented. "5
54 Id. at 405, 185 At. at 747, 748.
55 Lund v. Kline, 24 Ohio L. Abs. 387 (1937), rev'd on other grounds, 133
Ohio St. 317, 13 N.E.2d 575 (1938), where the evidence was allowed despite
Lo Schiavo v. Northern Ohio Traction & Light Co., 106 Ohio St. 61, 138 N.E. 372
(1922).
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Proof of Impairment of Earning Capacity in
Jurisdictions Where Evidence of Profits is Admissible
The admissibility of evidence of profits depends upon a determina-
tion of the relevancy question. Therefore no formula requiring specific
results can be designed. The evidence should be admitted when it is
more probable, as a matter of experience, reason and logic, that the
profits are the result of the personal labors of the plaintiff, rather than
the labor of others or a return on investments. The evidence should be
excluded when the opposite is true. In general economic terms the
plaintiffs who most probably will 'be able to have the evidence admitted
are the professional," the private entrepreneur"7 and the person whose
earnings are dependent upon a fee which he receives for the rendering
of a service.5" On the other hand, the plaintiffs who most probably will
not 'be able to have the evidence admitted are the merchant, " the manu-
facturer,"0 the member of a partnership0 1 and the industrial executive
whose earnings are dependent upon the profits of a business which he
owns, manages, or operates.6" These are mere labels primarily designed
for other purposes and cannot be used as a substitute for the underlying
test. Each case must be decided upon its facts, and no matter how a
person is styled by the business world, before he can introduce evidence
of profits, he must show that they are most probably the result of his
physical and intellectual labors.
56 Sluder v. St. Louis Transit Co., 189 Mo. 107, 88 S.W. 648 (1905) (phy-
sician) ; Stafford v. Oskaloosa, 64 Iowa 251, 20 N.W. 174 (1884) (physician) ;
Collins v. Dodge, 37 Minn. 503, 35 N.W. 368 (1887) ("professional man");
Marshall v. Wabash R. Co., 171 Mich. 180, 137 N.W. 89 (1912) (surgeon);
Nye v. Adamson, 130 Neb. 887, 266 N.W. 767 (1936) (attorney); Goode v.
Wills, 135 Cal. App. 21, 26 P.2d 504 (1933) (professional dancer).
5 7AIabama City, G. & A. Ry. Co. v. Lee, 200 Ala. 550, 76 So. 908 (1917)
(sawmill owner); Texas Electric Ry. v. Worthy, 250 S.W. 710 (Texas App.
1923) (automobile agency); Muench v. Heinemann, 119 Wis. 441, 96 N.W. 800
(1903) (grocer) ; Steitz v. Gifford, 280 N.Y. 15, 19 N.E.2d 661 (1939) (farmer) ;
Rogers v. Youngs, 252 Mich. 420, 233 N.W. 365 (1930) (boarding house operator);
Beebe v. Greene, 34 R.I. 171, 82 AtI. 797 (1912) (teamer) ; Hart v. Village of
New Haven, 130 Mich. 181, 89 N.W. 365 (1902) (livery stable owner); Kranold
v. City of New York, 186 N.Y. 40, 78 N.E. 572 (1906) (salesman); Offensend v.
Atlantic Refining Co., 322 Pa. 399, 185 Atl. 745 (1936) (cattle dealer) ; Sinclair
v. Columbia Telephone Co., 195 S.W. 558 (Mo. App. 1917) (farmer); Town of
Elba v. Bullard, 152 Ala. 237, 44 So. 412 (1907) (dressmaker) ; McLane v. Pitts-
burg Rys. Co., 230 Pa. 29, 79 At. 237 (1911) (peddler).
5s The type of cases falling under this heading involve such people as tele-
vision repairmen, plumbers, etc. There were no cases found wherein these persons
were involved.
5OMahoney v. Boston Elevated Ry., 221 Mass. 116, 108 N.E. 1033 (1915);
Dempsey v. Scranton, 264 Pa. 495, 107 At. 877 (1919) ; Pueblo v. Griffin, 10 Colo.
366, 15 Pac. 616 (1887); Lo Schiavo v. Northern Ohio Traction & Light Co.,
106 Ohio St. 61, 138 N.E. 372 (1922); Weir v. Union Ry. Co. of New York City,
188 N.Y. 416, 81 N.E. 168 (1907).
60 Silsby v. Michigan Car Co., 95 Mich. 204, 54 N.W. 761 (1893) ; Gentile v.
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The manner of presenting evidence of impairment of earning ca-
pacity will, of course, depend upon the individual counsel's trial technique.
However, there are certain minimum requirements that demand com-
pliance.
First, the duration of the impairment must be shown."3 By duration
it is meant that the plaintiff must show whether the impairment is perma-
nent, temporary or indefinite. The proof required to establish this fact
is no different than that required to show duration as regards other ele-
ments of damage like pain and suffering, medical expenditures and
inconvenience. Counsel should relate the proof of duration to each of
these elements, so that the jury will not be as likely to decide on their
own that merely because the plaintiff will continue to endure pain and
suffering and medical expenses he will also continue to endure an im-
pairment of earning capacity.
Second, the extent of the impairment must be shown.0 4 By extent
it is meant that the plaintiff must show whether the impairment is total
or partial. Some attorneys seem to believe that the extent of the impair-
ment can be deduced from the seriousness of the injury.65 These at-
torneys fail to see the tautology that was earlier mentioned-namely-
seriousness of the injury is defined by the courts by reference to the
amount of damages. When counsel rely upon the drawing of the in-
ference of extent of the impairment from the seriousness of the injury,
they might well find that the only time the inference is justified is when
the act of the defendant caused the immediate death of the plaintiff.66
This article is concerned with many more actions than wrongful death.
There must be evidence as to how disabled the plaintiff will be as a
result of the particular injuries.
Third, the pecuniary value of plaintiff's earning capacity must be
McLaughlin, 107 Pa. Super. 489, 164 At. 71 (1933); Bierbach v. Goodyear Rubber
Co., 54 Wis. 208, 11 N.W. 514- (1882).
61 St. Louis, I.M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Eichelman, 118 Ark. 36, 175 S.W. 388
(1915) ; Ray v. United Electric Rys. Co., 53 R.. 173, 159 At. 637 (1932);
Boggess v. Baltimore & O.R. Co., 234 Pa. 379, 83 At. 356 (1912).
62 There were no cases found in this area. This is probably the result of all
trial courts recognizing the fact that this evidence would be irrelevant to show
earning capacity.
63This will include a showing of the plaintiff's life expectancy.
64Burns v. Dunham, Corrigan & Hayden Co., 148 Cal. 208, 82 Pac. 959
(1905), where it was shown that the plaintiff continued to operate his business
with continuing success, thus showing that there was no impairment.
65Phillips v. Jaecker, 204 Wis. 273, 234 N.W. 745 (1931), where the plaintiff
failed to show that the injury disabled him from pursuing his labors. The court
recognized the fact that it could not be assumed that the injury caused such a
disability.
66 Where the injury causes death, it can be assumed that the earning capacity
of the deceased has been totally impaired.
1958]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
shown." In this section, the assumption is that evidence of profits may
be used for that purpose. Plaintiff may show the profit for individual
preceeding years or he may show an annual average.6" When there has
been an increase in profits in the most recent years, that is when the
economic cycle for the business is on an increase, the plaintiff probably
will show the profits for each individual year. On the other hand, if the
economic cycle is on a decrease the plaintiff will probably show the an-
nual average. The defendant should be alert to this practice and not
allow the plaintiff to gain any advantage merely because of the figures
he chooses. Plaintiff's present or future earning capacity must be shown
for purposes of comparison.
6 9
Fourth, the plaintiff should, and may be required to, offer all evi-
dence which will enable the jury to project the proof of past profits into
the future. If the trend of profits is increasing the plaintiff should intro-
duce expert evidence as to the probabilities that the increase will continue.
The study of economics has enabled industrial economists to make fairly
accurate and reliable predictions as to the economic future.7" The obliga-
tion of the plaintiff to offer this evidence is no different than the burden
imposed on the plaintiff in proving his entire case, when there are no
presumptions. The penalty for failure to meet this burden is the same.
These requirements are applicable to all cases no matter how ex-
tensive the injury or of what duration, except it will not be necessary to
project evidence of past profits into the future if the impairment was
temporary and has ceased to exist at the time of the trial. In a case where
a temporary injury has occurred and has ceased prior to the time of the
trial, the plaintiff has a better opportunity to demonstrate the relevancy
of the evidence of profits. He might be able to show that the market
conditions remained the same during the disability and that the labor of
others was held constant, except for the plaintiff's personal control and
supervision. This would negate the factors which in other cases cause
profits to fail to reflect plaintiff's earning capacity. The plaintiff has in
fact conducted a controlled experiment where all of the variables were
held constant. The changed result can, therefore, be attributed to the
uncontrolled variable-plaintiff's earning capacity. Future profits can-
not be tested in this manner. If the plaintiff is unable to show that the
economic conditions remained the same and that the labor of others re-
mained constant, except for the personal control and supervision, then
past profits have all of the inherent errors of future profits.71
67 Simpson v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 210 Pa. 101, 59 Atl. 693 (1904). Sve
note 25 supra.
68 Sinclair v. Columbia Telephone Co., 195 S.W. 558 (Mo. App. 1917).
69Town of Elba v. Bullard, 152 Ala. 237, 44 So. 412 (1907); Phillips v.
Jaecker, supra note 65.
7OSupra at page 185.
71 Supra at page 183-84.
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In Kranold v. City of New York72 the issue was raised as to
whether the plaintiff might testify as to what portion of profits was due
to plaintiff's abilities and what portion was a return on invested capital.
Unfortunately, the court did not get to the problem. The plaintiff had
introduced evidence of $3000 per year profits from a business requiring
an investment of $1000 and the trial court refused to allow the issue of
impairment of earning capacity to go to jury. The trial court held that
by plaintiff's own testimony it was apparent that a part of the profits
were the result of return on investment and therefore the question could
not go to the jury. The plaintiff then tendered evidence of the portion
of profits attributable to return on investment. The frial court refused
this offer of testimony. Upon review, the court decided that the ratio
between profits and investment was almost conclusive argument against
the theory that plaintiff's business was one which yielded profits from in-
vested capital. Therefore, the court decided that the issue of loss of
earnings should have been submitted to the jury on the evidence of lost
profits. Two aspects of this decision are worthy of comment. First,
although there may be disagreement with the adoption of a ratio of 1 to
3 as almost conclusive of the fact that the profits were primarily the
result of plaintiff's personal abilities, the court adopted the correct ap-
proach. It was determined by experience, logic and reason that these
profits were relevant evidence of impairment of earning capacity.
Second, the question of plaintiff introducing evidence which is designed
to segregate the separate elements of profits is a challenging issue. The
logical answer is that the plaintiff should be permitted to do so, since this
is an attempt to reduce the evidence to its relevant parts. If this is the
decision, then the jury should receive only the evidence of profits which
is attributable to plaintiff's personal services, since this is the only relevant
portion of the evidence. If the defendant desires a further elaboration
of the mathematics, then he cannot complain if the answer to such in-
quiry contains evidence which would otherwise be irrelevant. Some
courts have adopted the view that the plaintiff cannot introduce evidence
of profits irrespective of ability to segregate the elements. "3 This view
rests on the "all or none" approach. That is, either the profits are
attributable to plaintiff's abilities and are admissible or they are attribut-
able to other factors as well and are inadmissible. These courts are
either adopting the view that elements of profits cannot be separated and
therefore they will not hear plaintiff attempt to do so, or that the sepa-
ration is so time consuming that the court will not permit it. As has been
earlier observed, impairment of earning capacity in many cases is the most
important element of damages and to formulate a rigid rule against the
admissibility of what may be plaintiff's best evidence for either of the
foregoing reasons is a substantial denial of justice to the plaintiff.
72 186 N.Y. 40, 78 N.E. 572 (1906).
73 Supra at page 191.
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Proof of Impairment of Earning Capacity in
Jutsdictons Where Evidence of Profits is Inadmissible
When a court refuses to allow testimony of profits, for any reason,
the plaintiff still has the right to receive damages for impairment of
earning capacity. The obvious difficulty is what evidence is available to
the plaintiff to meet his burden. The cases are not much assistance iri
answering this problem. In Mahoney v. Boston Elevated Ry. Co.,7 4
the court stated:
One is not precluded from recovering loss of earning
capacity because he happens to be engaged in business for him-
self; but he cannot prove what is in substance profits from a
business under the semblance of earnings. The plaintiff may
show the nature and extent of the business conducted by him,
the part actually performed -by him, and the compensation
usually paid to those performing a like service for others.
These are circumstances which may be helpful in determining
the value of the time he has lost, in order to reach the ultimate
result of just compensation for the injury sustained.
After the plaintiff has introduced evidence of the nature and extent
of his 'business, including the economic prospects, he then introduces
testimony of his role in the business.75 The amount of education and
training and the cost thereof are relevant to plaintiff's earning capacity.
He may testify as to compensation of others who are doing like or
similar work and he may testify as to their earning capacity, if it is not
in the form of profits. 76
Where the business has employed another to occupy plaintiff's
former position evidence of salary to this individual is relevant to plain-
tiffs earning capacity.7 7 However, contrary to the holding in Lombardi
v. California Street R. Co.,,8 this amount should not be a maximum for
plaintiff's recovery. The fact that another has been hired in plaintiffs
stead is not conclusive that plaintiff's earning capacity is no more than
the value of the other person's services, nor is it conclusive that plaintiff's
earning capacity is equal to that of the substituted person.7" The plaintiff
could be more or less efficient or the immediate need created by plaintiffs
absence might be the controlling factor as opposed to the labor market
value of the new employee.
Any further discussion in this subsection of what evidence is avail-
able in a particular case would require knowledge of the facts of the
particular case. Otherwise, this would 'be an attempt to anticipate sources
74221 Mass. 116, 118, 108 N.E. 1033, 1034 (1915).
75 Hanna v. Stoll, 112 Ohio St. 344, 147 N.E. 339 (1925). See note 19 supra.
76 See note 19 supra.
77 Murphy v. Pittsburg Rys. Co., 292 Pa. 191, 140 At. 897 (1927) ; Lo Schiavo
v. Northern Ohio Traction & Light Co., 106 Ohio St. 61, 138 N.E. 372 (1922).
78 124 Cal. 311, 57 Pac. 66 (1899).
79 Stymes v. Boston Elevated Ry. Co., 206 Mass. 75, 91 N.E. 998 (1911).
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of pertinent lay and expert testimony. As a generalization, it would
appear that evidence of the marketability of one's labor is on the increase.
In the final analysis, the availability of evidence will, as always, be deter-
mined as a result of the investigation -by the plaintiff's counsel.
CONCLUSION
The problems that have arisen out of the role of profits in personal
injury litigation can be distilled into two. First, the plaintiff must show
that he has incurred an injury, and second, that the defendant's negligent
act caused the injury. These are not singularly difficulties of a plaintiff
attempting to show an impairment of earning capacity, but exist as re-
gards every damage for which plaintiff seeks compensation.
The first is a problem of proof. The plaintiff has the burden of
proving that he has been disabled to such an extent that his earning ca-
pacity has been impaired and he must show the extent of the impair-
ment. For these purposes he must show what his earning capacity whs
before the injury in comparison to what it is after the injury. When he
is engaged in a business which produces profits which are primarily the
result of his personal endeavors and where the labor of others and the
investment of capital is small, profits are a measure of his earning ca-
pacity and should be admitted as relevant evidence thereof. Evidence of
profits earned in the past are also relevant as to what the plaintiff would
have made in the future were it not for the defendant's act. Proof of
the economic future, if available, should be introduced by the plaintiff to
enable the jury to project the evidence of loss into the future. The
courts should recognize that the future as -regards impairment of earning
capacity is no different than the future in respect to other elements of
damages, and that the best rule is one that requires the plaintiff to intro-
duce only the best evidence obtainable.
Second, the plaintiff must show that his injury was caused by the
defendant. As with the first, if profits are to be the measure, to prove
the causation the plaintiff must show that the profits were the result of
his personal abilities. He must show that the exercise of his faculties
determined the amount of the profits. If he cannot do so then he must
show the value of his services through other evidence.
Finally, many of the problems that have been encountered in this
area could and should be averted by proper presentation of the plaintiff's
case. Failure to do so produces no reward for plaintiff or his counsel.
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